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Abstract: To resolve global political and scholarly concerns over conflict minerals (“CM”) produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighboring regions, two kinds of CM-related disclosure rules (or “CM rules”) come into play in regulating their use: government-mandated laws such as Section 1502
of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States (hereinafter “Sec. 1502”) and transnational voluntary codes such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition
(“EICC”) Code of Conduct. The creation of both of these CM rules could be attributed to the promotion of such concerns by the United Nations. This article is
the first attempt to unpack and closely consider the process of two distinct types
of CM rules that are probably transplanted into Taiwan through global supply
chains.
This article joins a growing body of literature that deepens our understanding of
the channels and objects of legal transplants. The findings of the Taiwanese
case study are important for two reasons. First, in terms of the transplant process or channels, some Taiwanese companies have started to follow CM rules
due to their supply contracts, demonstrating that applicable CM rules might
have been transplanted into Taiwan through private channels such as supply
contracts, rather than through the formal public channels of legal transplanta
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tion initiated by the government. Second, but just as importantly, with regard to
transplanted objects, what further distinguishes this article from prior studies is
that the Taiwanese case study could indicate that Taiwanese suppliers comply
with CM rules established by the EICC more prevalently than those promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act. If so, this would imply that when it comes to
adopting or implementing transnational corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)
standards in suppliers’ countries or jurisdictions, private CSR standards written
by non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) or industries themselves in a bottom-up approach are more effective or more easily accepted than public standards such as state laws enacted by a foreign/national government in a top-down
approach.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The domestic armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its adjacent countries have caused severe humanitarian crises and
have, for a long time, been a critical issue internationally. According to the
final report provided by the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (the “Panel of Experts”) sent by the United Nations (“UN”), it
is concerning that some business transactions involving natural resources
may have financed armed conflicts within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and its neighboring regions.1 Specifically, tin, tungsten, tantalum,
and gold (known collectively as “3TG”)2 are minerals often used in hightechnology manufacturing; they are called conflict minerals (“CM”) because in many cases their production in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and neighboring regions are probably controlled by armed groups.3
However, as foreign buyers may not be aware of this damaging situation,
the Panel of Experts has cooperated with the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) to illuminate this issue for the
business sector in the western world.4 The UN Security Council has clearly
indicated that international society should cooperate to prevent financial
profits made from exploiting natural resources being funneled into the
funds supporting domestic armed conflicts, and that Member States should
ensure that domestic industries are aware of the origin of the minerals they
use.5
In addition to national governments and local non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) concerned about the CM issue, foreign NGOs and
businesses, especially those that utilize certain minerals in their manufacturing, also started to care about this issue.6 One representative example is the
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (“EICC”), which founded the
Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (“CFSI”) in 2008, a general survey on
conflict-free smelters and refiners, together with the Global e-Sustainability
1 Letter from the U.N Secretary-General, to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 4,
10-11, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Illegal Exploitation] (Rep. of the
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003)).
2 See GLOBAL WITNESS, Conflict Minerals, https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/
conflict-minerals/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); Nadine Hawa, Conflict Minerals in Supply
Chains, FSC Rules Breached in Asia and WWF and Coke Expand Cooperation, ETHICAL
CORPORATION (Sep. 3, 2013), http://www.ethicalcorp.com/supply-chains/ngowatch
-september-2013 [hereinafter Nintendo under Fire].
3 Illegal Exploitation, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9-10.
4 Id. ¶¶ 10-12, 20-21.
5 S.C. Res. 1857, ¶¶ 6-7, 13, 15 (Dec. 22, 2008).
6 See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 2; Enough Project, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, (last
visited Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals.
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Initiative (“GeSI”).7 The “private” CM rule-making by the EICC further required its members to avoid using CMs as part of their code of conduct.8
Later, national legislators also embarked on “public” CM rule-making,
with the United States setting the trend of introducing CM-related laws.9
Specifically, whereas the Trump administration has launched a potential rethink of the current CM rules adopted by the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”),10 Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”),11 by amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, required U.S. public companies to carry out CM due diligence investigations (“CM investigations”)
and disclose the possible use of CM in their manufacturing process sourced
from the war-ravaged Congo and adjoining countries in Africa.12 Subsequent to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, it was not only U.S. businesses
that worried about difficulties in implementing CM disclosures; businesses
overseas, e.g., parts and materials manufacturers in Japan, were also concerned about the effect created by the new CM rule, even though it was laid
down by a foreign government.13 In addition, Taiwanese electronics manu7

See Responsible Minerals Initiative, http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/about/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2018) 錯誤! 超連結參照不正確。(formerly known as Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI)). The EICC, the alliance of US-based electronics industries for corporate social responsibility, has been cooperating with GeSI (the Europe-based organization
promoting sustainability in the ICT industry) to develop “the Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS)
program, which starts with the audit of smelters/refiners and is expected to be used as a
means to validate trading from there through the downstream supply chain by inspecting
whether conflict minerals that fund armed groups have entered the supply chain.” JEITA Responds to Conflict Minerals Provision of the U.S. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, JAPAN ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
ASSOCIATION, (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.jeita.or.jp/english/topics/2012/0823/
20120823_en.pdf.
8 See infra Part II.B (discussing CM rules made by the EICC).
9 David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1279-81
(2016).
10 See infra Part II.C (discussing the current CM rules adopted by the SEC).
11 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012).
12 See infra Part II.C (discussing the US CM rule-making). The EU CM rule is at the final
draft stage and the current proposed rule would apply to all “conflict zones” around the
world, while its US counterpart only applies to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
neighboring region. See ROPES & GRAY LLP, The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation – Frequently Asked Questions and Take-Aways for Downstream Companies (or Why Should I
Care About Yet Another New Supply Chain Regulation?), https://www.ropesgray.com/news
room/alerts/2017/09/The-EU-Conflict-Minerals-Regulation-Frequently-Asked-Questionsand-Take-Aways-for-Downstream.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); Marcia Narine Weldon,
Did the EU Learn from Dodd-Frank When Enacting its Conflict Minerals Rules?, BUSINESS
LAW PROF BLOG (June 17, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/06/
did-the-eu-learn-from-dodd-frank-when-enacting-its-conflict-minerals-rules.html.
13 See, e.g., Nintendo under Fire, supra note 2; Tetsuji Santazono, US Conflict-Mineral
Rules Rattle Global Supply Chain, NIKKEI ASIA REVIEW (May 15, 2014),
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facturers were also impacted by the U.S. CM rule, either because they listed
shares in the U.S. stock market, or because they served directly or indirectly
as a supplier to U.S. buyers.14
The aforementioned phenomena reflect that many industries have already outsourced their functions to suppliers overseas or applied a “fragmented” manufacturing structure, where components of a single product
may be manufactured by contract suppliers in various countries.15 Therefore, a U.S. buyer will need cooperation from its foreign suppliers—
possibly in the form of supply contracts—to satisfy the requirements of relevant rules, which are either hard public/regulatory laws or soft voluntary
rules.16 This article thus explores the practices of Taiwanese suppliers’
compliance with CM rules, illustrating legal transplantation through private
contracting in a globalized world in the case of CM rules, and tests whether
the U.S. legislators’ expected and desired extraterritorial goal of Section
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereinafter “Sec. 1502”) to indirectly regulate
an entire global supply chain can be met.17 The Taiwanese case study could
reveal that some Taiwanese companies have made supply-chain transparency efforts due to their supply contracts, thus suggesting that relevant corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) standards, whether of a non-domestic
public or a voluntary private nature, have been transplanted into Taiwan.
This article will join a growing body of literature that deepens our understanding of the channels and objects of legal transplants. The findings
are important for two reasons. First, in terms of the channels of legal transplants, from the supplier’s point of view, when they try to meet requirements laid down by their buyers, they are also “complying” with the buyers’ domestic laws, or with transnational voluntary codes of conduct
indirectly included in supply contracts. It is especially intriguing that this
extraterritorial effect of domestic laws in a buyer’s home country may take
place with CM rules being transposed to a supplier’s host country via private contracting channels. This phenomenon, resulting from the globalization of business outsourcing, might illustrate a legal transplant in the modhttp://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20140515-The-bitter-divide/Politics-Economy/US-conflictmineral-rules-rattle-global-supply-chain.
14 Yihua Li & Jingwei Wang, Mei Guo “Chong Tu Kuang Chan” Jie Lou Yao Qiu Dui
Tai Wan Qi Ye De Chong Ji [The Impact of U.S. “Conflict Minerals” Disclosure
Requirements on Taiwanese Businesses], 327 KUAI JI YAN JIU YUE KAN [ACCT. RES.
MONTHLY] 28, 31 (2013) (Taiwan).
15 Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 749–
50 (2014). Previous studies on car manufacturers also found this kind of fragmented manufacturing structure. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a
Global Economy, 72 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 135, 135 (2005).
16 See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor
Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 722 (2009); see
also infra Part II for further discussion.
17 See infra Part III.
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ern sense in comparative law studies. Specifically, a rule (be it a government-mandated law or a voluntary code of conduct) could be transplanted
into a host country and might be obeyed by foreign suppliers to an extent.
In this case, such a rule is indirectly transferred through private contracting
across borders. This would exemplify the private implementation or enforcement of CM rules under global supply chains in particular, or transnational private governance of CSR standards in general. As opposed to legal
transplantation through public channels initiated by a sovereign government
organ, the Taiwanese case study could be interpreted as another type of legal transplant via private channels in a globalized world.18
Second, but just as important, when it comes to legal transplants, this
article can be further distinguished from prior studies in that the Taiwanese
case study could indicate that Taiwanese suppliers comply with the CM
rules established by the EICC more prevalently than those promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act. This could indicate that when it comes to adopting
or implementing transnational CSR standards in suppliers’ countries or jurisdictions, private CSR standards written by NGOs or industries themselves in a bottom-up approach would be more effective, or widely acceptable, than public standards such as state laws enacted by a foreign national
government in a top-down approach.
The article is structured as follows. Part I covers the literature on legal
transplants and private governance in general as well as private governance
through global supply chains in particular, and provides a conceptual
framework for the legal transplantation of CSR standards. Part II outlines
the CM rules involved in the Taiwanese case study and Part III makes a
case for legal transplants through private contracting in a globalized world
by analyzing Taiwanese suppliers’ compliance with applicable CM rules.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes and draws policy implications from our
major findings.
II.

LEGAL TRANSPLANTS THROUGH PRIVATE
CONTRACTING IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

A Legal Transplant Primer
The term “legal transplant,” from a comparative law perspective, usually indicates the phenomenon of a domestic law being transferred across
borders into another country or jurisdiction.19 Alan Watson coined the term
in the 1970s, although it was not commonly used until later.20 The practice
18

See infra Part I (illustrating the matrix for legal transplantation of CSR standards).
JOHN GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A ‘RULE OF
LAW’ IN VIETNAM 3 (2006).
20 John W. Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J.
19
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of legal transplantation, however, has a long history, and is a familiar phenomenon in the history of law.21
Historically, there were no fixed patterns of legal transplants, which
depend on the transplant background and the transplant society. The scale
of legal transplants may vary from transferring legal systems wholesale during the age of colonization,22 to accepting a whole set of laws and values
during times of war,23 to voluntarily importing “superior” legal systems
through a formal legislative process in the transplant country.24 Legal transplantation may also take place owing to other political interactions between
states, such as compliance with WTO-related agreements,25 or harmonization with western-business laws backed by legal harmonization projects,
which began in the 1990s.26
The legal transplants mentioned above were initiated by legislators or
regulators in a home government with the following exemplified incentives
of receiving a transplant and corresponding patterns of legal transplants.27
For instance, it might be a “best choice” made by legislators after carefully
comparing different solutions in different legal systems. 28 In addition, directly borrowing an existing law may be cost-effective for legislators,
whereas the costs for society of adopting new laws cannot be ignored.29
Moreover, even if intending to borrow existing foreign laws, legislators in
the transplant country might not have actually thoroughly examined all existing foreign laws, but could easily import legal systems from another
country that seemed to be far superior; although this transplant may seem
practical, importing laws without thoughtfully considering how they fit into
another domestic legal order may raise adaptation concerns.30
INTL’L & COMP. L. 637, 640 (2013).
21 See Mathias M. Siems, The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplant, in THE
METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE
133, 133 (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 2014); Gillespie, supra note 19, at 3-4.
22 Id. at 4.
23 Id. at 4-5.
24 Id. at 11.
25 Id. at 9.
26 Id. at 5, 8-9.
27 For a complete description of the incentives and motivations behind legal transplants,
see, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal
History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839,
843–67 (2003) (presenting four types of legal transplants based on the motives of tranplant
countries: (i) The Cost-Saving Transplant; (ii) The Externally-Dictated Transplant; (iii) The
Entrepreneurial Transplant; and (iv) The Legitimacy-Generating Transplant).
28 MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 192 (2014).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 193; Chang-hsien Tsai, The Failure of Corporate Internal Controls and
Internal Information Sharing: A Conceptual Framework for Taiwan, 45 HONG KONG L.J.
469, 497 (2015) (illustrating that “merely transplanting foreign ‘advanced’ corporate law
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Although commentators question whether imported laws will take root
in the new land and function just as they did in their country of origin,31 legal literature has also indicated that transplanted laws are mostly considered
to remain functional to some extent, while the focus should be placed on
“choos[ing] and design[ing] legal transplants as well as possible.”32 Take
Taiwan for example: legislators often take a “direct transplantation” approach, which is to borrow supposedly better solutions sourced from laws
of such advanced economies as the United States; Taiwan’s government required public companies to establish independent directors and audit committees, in order to follow internationally common practices of corporate
governance, although those specific regulatory tools may not be completely
compatible with the existing Taiwanese business law environment.33
In general, common practice in legal transplant studies is to examine
the transfer of statutory or regulatory laws across boundaries through government branches such as public legislative or regulatory channels as well
as the effects they would generate in legal cultures of importing countries,
or how the laws would evolve in a new culture. Nonetheless, as statutes or
regulations in an exporting country are sometimes transferred through nonstate actors, non-governmental channels (such as multi-national corporations and other private entities, such as NGOs) may also play an important
role. Specifically, in a globalized world where nations are inevitably linked
by cross-border transactions and transnational manufacturing chains, how
the global market and global supply chains can affect the transfer of statutes
and regulations has actually become a popular topic.34 This article provides
another example of legal transplants via private contracting: the transplantation of such CSR standards as CM rules (be they foreign governmentmandated laws or voluntary codes of conduct established by NGOs)
through private procurement contracts underlying global supply chains.
Although some ink may have been spilled in attempts to discuss legal
transplantation through private contracting, what distinguishes this article
from others is that the Taiwanese case study suggests that Taiwanese suppliers comply with CM rules developed by the EICC more prevalently than
those enacted under the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, indicating that private standards in a bottom-up approach might be more effective and widely acceptable than public ones in a top-down approach, when it comes to adopting and

provisions into local regulatory infrastructure may not prove a success-guaranteed solution
to existing corporate governance problems.”).
31 SIEMS, supra note 28, at 196.
32 Id. at 197-98.
33 See Tsai, supra note 30, at 470-72, 497; In-Jaw Lai, Fa Zhi De Yi Zhi: Cong Gong Si
Lu Dao Du Li Dong Shi [Legal Transplants—From the Kung-ssu-lü (Company Law) to the
Independent Director], 84 TAIPEI UNIV. L. REV. 1, 29-30, 37-40 (2012).
34 Lin, supra note 16, at 713-15.
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implementing transnational CSR standards.35
Legal Transplants and Transnational Private Governance
In the era of globalization, more and more non-state actors appear to
be able to act as regulators. For example, the term “global administrative
law” refers to the phenomenon that cross-national organizations are gradually performing legislative and regulatory roles that, in the past, belonged
solely to national governments. Along this line, there are five types of global administration: (1) regulation by international organizations composed of
national governments, such as the UN Security Council and its committees;
(2) cross-national cooperation among domestic governmental regulatory
agencies, such as the operation of the Basel Committee; (3) regulation by
national regulatory agencies according to international treaties or other similar agreements; (4) hybrid structures where governments cooperate with
private organizations; and (5) regulation solely by private bodies (private
NGOs) that have substantive regulatory functions, mainly exemplified by
the International Standardization Organization (“ISO”).36
Among the aforementioned global administrative schemes, some
scholars have turned their interest to the final type: private regulatory bodies. Some commentators have suggested the idea of “non-state marketdriven (NSMD) governance” to explain the source of these private regulatory bodies’ power: the pressure from markets (including consumers or other
concerned parties) has driven the heads of regulated organizations (e.g., enterprises) to take necessary actions, and the “governance” goal is attained
via this channel.37 In this case, the regulated organizations comply with
“voluntary codes” (for example, international standards, certification
schemes, codes of conduct, and the like); those voluntary codes are “not
legislatively required,” and hence lack the power of traditional laws.38
Therefore, when studying private regulatory schemes on a global scale,
the regulatory schemes operated by NGOs are also referred to as “transnational private regulation” (TPR) regimes.39 TPR regimes are important because it is more difficult for national government organs to regulate private
35

See infra Part III.
See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20-23 (2005); see generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword:
Global Governance as Administration–National and Transnational Approaches to Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005).
37 See, e.g., Kernaghan Webb, Corporate Citizenship and Private Regulatory Regimes:
Understanding New Governance Roles and Functions, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND NEW
GOVERNANCE 39, 41 (Ingo Pies & Peter Koslowski eds., 2011).
38 Id.
39 Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational
Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2011).
36
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cross-border activities, so a transnational regulatory scheme is necessary.40
For transnational enterprises operating under these regulatory schemes,
pressure (usually from outside) for adoption, implementation, or enforcement would force them to consider complying with voluntary codes. For
example, in the area of human rights, many international standards were set
up by NGOs, which also serve as active monitors by keeping an eye on
those enterprises.41 Apart from pressure from NGOs, some investors may
also use their votes to influence managerial decisions (i.e., a voice response
to dissatisfaction with organizational behavior under Albert Hirschman’s
conceptual framework), or even select investment targets or sell their shares
in a public market based on one company’s CSR performance (i.e., an exit
response under Hirschman’s framework), which is called socially responsible investment (“SRI”).42 The pressure from transnational markets has become more significant in this era of globalization because globalization
makes it harder for national governments to regulate activities overseas, or
for concerned stakeholders in a host country to request the company headquarters in their home country to take the responsibility for injuries caused
by local foreign subsidiaries or affiliated legal entities.43 Therefore, a crossborder regulatory regime is required in order to hold multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) responsible for negative effects resulting from their overseas activities, such as outsourcing for manufacturing. 44 Nevertheless, as
mentioned above, the rules laid down and promoted by private organizations are voluntary per se; even if those who adopt the rules violate any of
them, there might not be any direct way to impose a punishment.45 Sometimes domestic laws such as contract laws are still necessary when market
pressure is insufficient.46
When it comes to who plays a rule-making role in private regulatory
regimes, private organizations without governmental regulatory power are
in the central position of being able to set up rules that should be followed
by their members, and the rules are “enforced” via market pressure. Several
types of private regulators include standards development organizations, as
explained below, writing private standards for users to voluntarily obey in

40

Id. at 2.
Id. at 7-8.
42 Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 257-58 (Andrew Crane et
al. eds., 2008).
43 Gregory R. Day, Private Solution to Global Crisis, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1079, 109091 (2015).
44 See id. at 1092-96.
45 Deirdre Curtin & Linda Seden, Public Accountability of Transnational Private
Regulation: Chimera or Reality?, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 163, 169 (2011).
46 See Day, supra note 43, at 1082-83, 1095-97.
41
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conducting business.47 Although in the past, international standards mostly
concerned technical standards “that address network externalities,” recently
more environmentally oriented private regulatory standards, such as those
on greenhouse gas emissions that “address social and environmental externalities,” have been promulgated.48 A type of a standards development organization is a hybrid organization consisting of industrial associations and
NGOs: for instance, the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) tackles forest
management via cooperation between NGOs such as the World Wildlife
Fund and companies such as retailers or manufacturers in wood-related industries.49 Another common type of the voluntary code is codes of conduct
or regulatory standards developed by private firms to apply to themselves
only; most large MNEs also have their own supplier codes of conduct that
they require their suppliers to comply with.50 One issue of concern is how to
enforce those voluntary rules, as sanctions are to some extent necessary.
Examples of enforcement mechanisms of these voluntary rules include expelling members from voluntary programs in the case of a severe violation
of the rules, and refusing to procure materials from code-violating suppliers.51 Occasionally “naming and shaming” is considered a fairly powerful
tool, e.g., via tagging offending suppliers with rule-breaking signs, or refusing to assign recognition or certification to them, in order to generate signals for buyers or consumers expressing concerns; these entities also “contribute to the sanction by denying a company’s ‘social license to
operate.’”52
In a variety of fields, these voluntary rules already play important roles
in guiding business behavior, as a category of regulatory measures with actual effects. Therefore, we might tend to recognize the importance of private regulation in the context of regulatory competition, or the market for
law.53 If we think that law itself possesses the functions of social norms or
social institutions, voluntary codes established by private organizations, as
one of the social norms or social institutions possibly compete with public
47 Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L.
291, 301 (2014) (Generally speaking, “private regulators of different types carry out the
three elements of regulation: setting, implementing, and enforcing standards.”).
48 Id. at 304-05.
49 Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 51-53 (2006).
50 McAllister, supra note 47, at 307.
51 Id. at 314.
52 Id. at 314-16.
53 For a further explanation of how demand and supply dynamics shaping regulatory
competition (or the market for law) constrains regulating jurisdictions from disregarding
business demands and from imposing excessive regulation, see generally Chang-hsien Tsai,
Demand and Supply Forces in the Market for Law Interplaying through Jurisdictional Competition: Basic Theories and Cases, 1 EAST ASIAN L. J. 1 (2010).
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or regulatory laws.54 In terms of rulemaking by MNEs and NGOs, the rules
they choose and how they choose the rules may generate additional important effects.55 These common private regimes established by private actors sometimes fill the gap with their quasi-regulatory effects where statutory laws are nonexistent or inflexible.56 Private regimes might ultimately
affect statutory laws or even be merged into public laws; there have already
been some examples of this.57 For instance, governmental agencies could
directly endorse private regulatory regimes; the Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points (“HACCP”) regulation established by the United States
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) illustrates endorsed self-regulation.58
However, when cooperative production or outsourcing is required
through a transnational supply chain across multiple countries, how to
maintain control of overall production in a global marketplace is an imminent problem, for example, in that there is an absence of effective legal and
regulatory infrastructure.59 Large global buyer firms may seek suitable voluntary codes of conduct for supply chain management; third-party assurance thus has been regarded as the measure for ensuring the realization of
the goals these voluntary codes would achieve.60 This may, to an extent, account for the rise of the third-party assurance industry with the ISO as a
representative contributor.61
In recent years, the third-party assurance industry has gradually been
performing an important role in “a private sector compliance and enforcement infrastructure,” even “providing a substitute for public legal and regulatory infrastructure in global commerce.” This industry has provided a
novel institutional structure “through which private commercial exchange
54 Dan Wielsch, Global Law’s Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1075, 1076-77 (2012); Peer C. Zumbansen, Neither ‘Public’ nor ‘Private’,
‘National’ nor ‘International’: Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist
Perspective, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 50, 51-52 (2011).
55 Standard contract terms were used as an example. If one such term is adopted by multiple companies, then it may evolve into a standard within this group of companies; furthermore, the influence of this standard will become even larger if being used by industry associations or similar organizations. It might also become an international standard once it is
used globally. However, this kind of generally applicable “standard” has not gone through a
formal legislative process, and therefore different legitimacy concerns embedded in similar
standards should be taken into consideration. Wielsch, supra note 54, at 1078-79.
56 Id. at 1080.
57 Id. at 1081.
58
McAllister, supra note 47, at 322-23.
59 Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce,
33 J. CORP. L. 325, 327-28 (2008).
60 Id. at 336-37.
61 Id. at 331. For an in-depth treatment of the ISO, see generally CRAIG N. MURPHY &
JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS (2009).
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may be regulated for essentially public purposes” while engaging in activities whose purpose “in the past would be considered ‘public’ and ‘regulatory’ in nature, and left to the authority of government.”62
When parts of the production process are assigned to suppliers in other
countries, in order to ensure that their quality of production meets the purchasing company’s internal standards, global buyers from time to time rely
on monitoring services provided by the third-party assurance industry.63
Furthermore, as more weight has been laid on the concept of CSR in recent
years, many SRI institutional investors (including public pension funds) are
looking at the environmental and social performance of their portfolio companies. Therefore, MNEs need to monitor whether their suppliers meet certain CSR standards in order to lower the risks resulting from any negative
effect of not meeting CSR standards within global supply chains.64 Common CSR-related standards directly established by NGOs include Social
Accountability 8000 (“SA 8000”) set up by Social Accountability International, providing standards for international labor and human rights protection,65 and voluntary CSR codes developed within industries such as forestry.66 Facing various CSR standards, some businesses voluntarily adopt
voluntary CSR standards and hire their own third-party certifiers to certify
that CSR norms are implemented and enforced throughout their supply
chains.67 These certifications and third-party assurance may thus lower the
cost for players in global supply chains to acquire information about how
others comply with required standards, and it may be cost-effective for
businesses to engage professionals in specific fields to monitor compliance
practices of their contracting counterparty, or to act as reputation intermediaries.68
As a result of serving as monitors as well as entities to issue certifications, these third-party assurance firms have gradually been acquiring the
ability to ensure that monitored subjects comply with corresponding voluntary codes of conduct. Along this line, they have also come to play a truly
regulatory role not merely in the substantive sense that they facilitate “the
62

Blair et al., supra note 59, at 329.
Id. at 336-37.
64 Id. at 337-39.
65 SA 8000 is a standard based on international humanitarian conventions, and on the topic of protecting labor rights within corporations through internal control schemes. See Social
Accountability International,See SA8000® Standard and Documents, SA8000® STANDARD,
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=937 (last visited Jul.
3, 2016).
66 Meidinger, supra note 49, at 74 (citing the FSC, an international body accrediting organizations to certify that timber and forest products meet the FSC standards for sustainable
forest management).
67 Blair et al., supra note 59, at 342-44.
68 Id. at 355-56.
63
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transmission of global ‘rule of law’ norms of acceptable business behavior
to new parts of the world,”69 but also in the procedural sense: in performing
certain contract-facilitating and contract-enforcing functions, “the assurance
service can perhaps be understood as importing ‘rule of law’ procedural
norms into countries where legal institutions are weak.”70
Supply Contracts as a Tool for Transnational Private Governance
As mentioned above, voluntary standards and third-party certifications
have played large roles in the implementation and enforcement of CSR
norms, both between businesses and their customers and between businesses.71
Across the current global marketplace, the importance of subcontracting suppliers is indeed high, in consideration of the fact that many global
brands have actually outsourced most of their manufacturing to their foreign suppliers; this kind of transactional structure also implies that global
corporations must build relationships with their foreign suppliers in an everexpanding set of manufacturing activities.72 Monitored by the media,
NGOs, SRI analysts, and even global buyers’ own CSR auditors or verifiers, the issues that receive particular attention are human rights, employment, and ethical or environmental performance in the manufacturing process some way down global supply chains.73
To lower the reputational risk incurred from higher-risk suppliers,
some enterprises have started to devote more efforts to supply chain CSR
management, and some have tried to integrate CSR codes into their riskmanagement policies or the strategies they use to select suppliers.74 This
developing situation may indicate a type of private governance where subcontracting suppliers are regulated by their buyers in implementing and enforcing CSR codes.75
Previous studies focusing on supply relationships found that recently,
69 Id. at 329. See also id. at 338 (furnishing an explanation of how supply chain pressures
lead to the externally dictated legal transplant by saying that “developed country business
standards and norms are being propagated worldwide”).
70 Id. at 356-57.
71 See supra Part I.
72 Grossman & Helpman, supra note 15, at 135.
73 Doreen McBarnet & Marina Kurkchiyan, Corporate Social Responsibility through
Contractual Control? Global Supply Chains and ‘Other-Regulation’, in THE NEW
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 59, 62-63
(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2009).
74 Id. at 63-64.
75 Id. at 67 (“Some [MNE] manager reported the unwelcome realization that by taking on
CSR responsibilities they have acquired a greatly expanded role. In effect they are stepping
into the shoes of the government in the supplier countries, by policing and enforcing the noncommercial law of the land”) (alteration in original).
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supply contracts no longer comprise solely traditional contract terms such
as prices, but also CSR criteria, with protection of labor rights as a main example.76 Buyers77 have incentives to require their suppliers to obey the
aforementioned CSR norms or standards, especially in suppliers’ countries
that lack sufficient proper substantive law or enforcement mechanisms, thus
filling the regulatory gap between buyers’ and suppliers’ countries.78 Similar results were also found in a famous study on disclosed U.S. supply contracts; supply contracts have already been used as a tool to regulate foreign
suppliers on CSR issues such as environmental protections.79
Among Taiwanese corporations, there are also examples of being
“regulated by supply chains”. For instance, when Apple Inc. was criticized
by the media due to undesirable working conditions in their supplier factories that did not meet related standards, not only was the buyer, Apple, under pressure, but their main supplier, Foxconn (an Apple contractor headquartered in Taiwan but with major factories located in China), was also
required by Apple to improve the working environment in their Chinese
factories.80
In terms of transnational private governance (or TPR), global purchasing companies have actually been regulating their foreign suppliers to meet
the CSR standards required or expected by the marketplace in supply
chains. The buyers may hence be viewed as performing a regulatory role
traditionally played by governments alone. Supply contracts of this kind
may then function as a private governance regime.81
A New Taxonomy of Legal Transplants of Corporate Social Responsibility
Standards
While feeling the pressure applied from supply contracts, suppliers
tend to satisfy buyers’ requirements on CSR issues in most situations to
keep supply contracts.82 In such relationships, regulatory networks woven
76

Id. at 65.
For the purposes of this article, “buyers” generally refer to the enterprises acting as
buyers in a supply contract, although they may be the firms directly selling products to end
consumers or the suppliers in another contract at another stage of the same supply chain.
78 McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 73, at 66. Therefore, the control exerted through
supply contracts could be regarded as a possible mechanism for implementing international
codes of conduct, with MNEs’ “private law” potentially making up for failures in “state law”
in suppliers’ countries. Id.
79
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting
in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916-17 (2007).
80 See Barbara J. Fick, Corporate Social Responsibility for Enforcement of Labor Rights:
Are There More Effective Alternatives?, 4 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2014); Parella, supra
note 15, at 779-80.
81 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 943.
82 Parella, supra note 15, at 784. See also Lin, supra note 16, at 731 (“Since global buy77
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by contracts might turn buyers into private regulators through CSR standards, norms, or codes that are implemented or enforced through supply contracts.83 If those rules that are incorporated into supply contracts are public
or state laws in buyers’ countries, they may result in the domestic laws of
buyers’ home countries being applied and transferred across borders.84
Therefore, the implementation and enforcement of non-domestic rules
through private channels such as supply contracts may be viewed as a form
of legal transplantation through private actors in the eyes of suppliers’ host
countries, even though the objects to be transmitted are not limited to government-mandated laws in a foreign legal system but include private codes
of conduct in global commerce with regulatory features as well.85 On top of
that, the transposition across borders by MNEs of the aforementioned transnational voluntary codes with regulatory functions as well as their homecountry laws are carried out through transnational channels of private contracting, rather than through typical state legislative, regulatory, or judicial
processes at a national level.86
Hence, we could develop a matrix to outline four types of legal transplants for CSR standards, with transplant channels and transplanted objects
of CSR norms as criteria for differentiating cells for each distinct type. The
legal transplantation of CSR standards can be categorized as in Table 1 below.

ers with strong bargaining power condition business on implementation of vendor codes
[such as SA8000 and other similar standards], in order to obtain business, suppliers accept
the condition”) (alteration in original).
83
See supra Part I.
84 Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial Contracts:
New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1557, 1567 (2013). See infra Part III (discussing
how Taiwanese suppliers have made supply-chain transparency efforts to help their US buyers comply with CM rules under the Dodd-Frank Act).
85 Lin, supra note 16, at 730-34.
86 Id. at 713-15, 741.
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Table 1: Matrix for the Legal Transplantation of CSR Standards
Transplant channels
Public channels
(governmental organs
including legislatures,
regulatory agencies
or courts)
Transplanted
objects of
CSR norms

Public
standards

Private
Standards

Private (contracting)
channels
(global supply
chains)
Traditional legal
E.g., CM
transplantation
rules under
(Category 1)
the
Dodd-Frank
Act
(Category 2)
E.g., ISO 14001, as a E.g., CM
private standard, was
rules
transferred into the
established by
Chinese legal system.
the EICC
(Category 3)
(Category 4)

Category 1 in Table 1 refers to the typical transplantation of foreign
codified laws, regulations, or other public standards through public channels initiated by governmental organs in receiving countries, which is the
traditional form of legal transplants in comparative law studies.87 Category
3 indicates the transmission of voluntary private standards through public
state channels. For example, the Chinese government systemically promoted ISO 14001 by creating concrete measures and formally constructing the
implementation platform for ISO 14001 in China.88
By studying how Taiwanese suppliers complied with CM rules in order to demonstrate legal transplantation through private contracting channels in a globalized world, this article is focused on transplanting state laws
or transnational voluntary codes of conduct through supply contracts, as

87

For instance, Taiwan has traditionally relied on the binary or dual board model (also
known as the “two-tier system”) where both directors and supervisors (or company/statutory
auditors) are elected by shareholders. However, from the first decade of the twenty-first century until now, Taiwan’s legislative and executive branches have been collectively transplanting a unitary Anglo-American style of board of directors and independent directors (also known as the “one-tier system”) into corporate governance structures, with audit
committees replacing supervisors. Tsai, supra note 30, at 470-71.
88 See Lin, supra note 16, at 737.
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shown in Categories 2 and 4 in Table 1.89 Specifically, recognizing the notion that the transplant process can also embrace private channels (e.g.
through supply contracts) in addition to traditional public state channels,
Category 2 illustrates that state laws such as CM rules under the DoddFrank Act were included in supply contracts and thus transmitted to other
countries.90 Furthermore, if the transplanted objects could be voluntary
codes of conduct with regulatory features, albeit not adopted as government-mandated laws, then Category 4 denotes that the transnational voluntary codes exemplified by CM rules established by the EICC91 would be
conveyed, through private contracting channels, into a land where such
CSR norms have not yet been codified. In both Categories 2 and 4, global
purchasing companies, as private regulators, would play an important role
in not merely transposing CM rules but also in implementing or even enforcing them. Our case study on how Taiwanese suppliers comply with CM
rules in Part III illustrates the aforementioned two types of legal transplants
via private channels.
III.
CONFLICT MINERAL RULES
To resolve concerns over CMs, two kinds of CM rules come into play
in regulating their use: transnational voluntary codes (e.g. EICC Code of
Conduct) and government-mandated laws (e.g. Sec. 1502 of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).92 The creation of
both of these CM rules could be attributed to the promotion of such concerns by the UN and the OECD.93 Therefore, before carrying out the Taiwanese case study in Part III to look into the compliance practices of these
two CM rules or the process of how these two distinct types of CM rules
have already been transplanted into Taiwan, in Part II we will first discuss
and summarize why and how they were created.
The UN Resolutions
The long-lasting armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the Great Lakes region subjected people living there to serious
89 As suppliers in receiving countries have to follow CSR rules inserted into supply contracts by global buyers, this could also be interpreted as a form of legal transplantation. See
id. at 720-22.
90 As discussed in Parts II.C and III, CM rules under the Dodd-Frank Act are U.S. buyers’ home-country laws, which serve as an important reference for voluntary codes of conduct to incorporate into supply contracts. See id. at 721-22.
91 As discussed in Parts II.B and III, CM rules established by the EICC resemble the ISO
14001 Environmental Management System as procedural rules, rather than substantive requirements. See id.
92 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012)).
93 See infra Part II.
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humanitarian and economic hardship, thus drawing attention away from
global society. The UN Security Council decided in 2003 to ensure that any
financial and military assistance being given to armed groups were
stopped.94 The Panel of Experts assigned by the UN Security Council to investigate the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the nearby conflict regions indicated in their 2003 report that some foreign manufacturers had directly or indirectly funded domestic armed groups via the procurement of
minerals. As those foreign manufacturers were possibly unaware of the
negative effects of their procurement, the Panel of Experts also tried to
bring this issue to the attention of foreign buyers through cooperation with
other international organizations such as the OECD as those foreign manufacturers were possibly unaware of the negative effects of their procurement.95
These investigations heightened the awareness of the international
business community of their responsibilities on protecting human rights that
were indirectly threatened by transactions in their supply chains for CMs.96
The UN repeatedly sought to raise awareness on this issue via Resolutions,
particularly Resolutions 1533 and 1698.97 The UN, in its Resolution 1857,
called for international collaboration to prevent illicit transactions of raw
materials from becoming sources of funding for local armed groups to step
up their civil wars. 98 As a result, all Member States in the UN must now
verify that their domestic importers, manufacturers, and consumers are
aware of the origin of those minerals.99 The UN further required Member
States to urge manufacturers, importers, and consumers of Congolese mineral products to conduct due diligence regarding the origin of CMs and their
suppliers under Resolution 1896.100
EICC Code of Conduct
In addition to the public or governmental initiatives urged by the UN,
private actors such as NGOs and international trade associations have also
encouraged their members to take necessary measures to address CM problems. One representative example is the CFSI, co-established by the EICC
(the U.S. trade association) and GeSI (the European NGO), in order to provide relevant certifications, build up a database of certified smelters and re-

94

S.C. Res. 1493, at ¶18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (Jul. 28, 2003).
Illegal Exploitation, supra note 1, at 9-12.
96 Id. at 11.
97 See generally S.C. Res. 1533, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1533 (Mar. 12, 2004); S.C. Res. 1698,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1698 (Jul. 31, 2006).
98 Supra note 5, at 6-7, 13, 15.
99 Id. Supra note 5, at 6-7, 13, 15. Id.
100 S.C. Res. 1896, at 14-16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1896 (Nov. 30, 2009).
95
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fineries, and help their members procure conflict-free minerals.101 The
EICC has further incorporated “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals” into the
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition® (EICC®) Code of Conduct
(“EICC Code of Conduct”).102 At present, more than 100 EICC members,
many of which are large MNEs, voluntarily comply with the EICC Code of
Conduct.103 These organizations also require their first-tier suppliers to
comply with this voluntary code in order to satisfy the EICC Code of Conduct’s requirements.104 Those EICC member businesses usually have transnational supply chains;105 therefore their foreign suppliers, especially the
101 See the CFSI, supra note 7. See also Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Conflict Minerals Rule, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 328 (2016) (“The Conflict
Free Sourcing Initiative (‘CFSI’), a non-governmental organization formed by affected industries, put together a survey that companies could use to ask their suppliers about where
they obtained their conflict minerals”).
102 EICC, The Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition® (EICC®) Code of Conduct,
http://www.eiccoalition.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_English.pdf (last visited Jul.
6, 2016)(on file with the authors). Under “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals,” the EICC
Code of Conduct (Version 5.0, 2014) indicates:

Participants shall have a policy to reasonably assure that the tantalum, tin, tungsten
and gold in the products they manufacture does not directly or indirectly finance or
benefit armed groups that are perpetrators of serious human rights abuses in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country. Participants shall exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of these minerals and make
their due diligence measures available to customers upon customer request.
Id. at 9. Since the EICC just rebranded itself as the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) in
October 2017 to mark its next phase, we can also find new versions of the EICC Code of
Conduct (EICC Code of Conduct (Version 5.1, 2016) and RBA Code of Conduct (Version
6.0, 2018)), which all include the same “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals”. RBA, The RBA
Code of Conduct Is a Set of Standards on Social, Environmental and Ethical Issues in the
Electronics Industry Supply Chain, http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/standards/code-ofconduct/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
103 See EICC/RBA, Members, http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/about/members/ (last
visited Nov. 26, 2017).
104 Id. (“In addition to [EICC/]RBA members, thousands of companies that are Tier 1
suppliers to those members are required to implement the [EICC/]RBA Code of Conduct”)
(alteration in original). However, the EICC Code of Conduct does not specify any sanctions
and thus has to rely on market monitoring power; for example, “Microsoft, whose Xbox
game system is assembled by Foxconn, said it has a code of conduct that suppliers are required to meet, including factory inspections, or they risk losing contracts.” Adam Satariano
& Peter Burrows, No Company Follows Apple’s Expanded China Factory Audits,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2012-02-26/no-company-follows-apples-expanded-china-factory-audits.
105 See, e.g., Jason Dedrick et al., Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains?:
A Study of the Ipod and Notebook PCs, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 81, 91-93 (2009);
Yuqing Xing & Neal Detert, How iPhone Widens the US Trade Deficits with PRC, 10-21
GRIPS POLICY RESEARCH CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER 2-3 (Nov. 2010).
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first-tier suppliers, may also face pressure from EICC buyers to abide by the
rule of “Responsible Sourcing of Minerals” under the EICC Code of Conduct even if the suppliers themselves are not EICC members.
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States
Sec. 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act is another example of CM rules that
are public or government-mandated standards under U.S. law. Under DoddFrank, however, several articles are designed especially for other public interests. For example, Sec. 1502 was enacted “to bring transparency to supply chains in so-called ‘conflict minerals.’”106
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. Congress made several legislative attempts to require public companies to disclose their use of CMs, including the two respective proposals of the Conflict Minerals Trade Act107
and the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, both of which were proposed
in 2009.108 The Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 clearly referred to the
measures taken by the UN, the EICC, and GeSI as important reasons for
proposing the bill.109 Although neither proposal was actually passed by
Congress, these legislative efforts directly led to the creation of Sec. 1502, a
humanitarian and CSR clause less relevant to the Dodd-Frank Act focused
on financial reform.110
Sec. 1502 contains five primary paragraphs including paragraph (b) to
amend Sec. 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Securities Exchange Act”), which adds a new disclosure requirement of paragraph (p)
under the Securities Exchange Act.111 This new disclosure provision authorizes and requires the SEC to draft a detailed rule to regulate CM disclosures, requiring annual disclosures of CM use from U.S. public companies
(under paragraph (p)(1)(A)). U.S. companies must disclose whether CMs
are potentially used in their manufacturing, and the efforts they make in order to clarify the source of those materials (under paragraph (p)(1)(A)(ii)).
Sec. 1502 also defined “conflict minerals” in paragraph (e) as basically consisting of coltan, gold, cassiterite, and wolframite, if their production funds
armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or its adjacent
countries. Therefore, under Sec. 1502, enterprises that are issuers under the
Securities Exchanges Act are obliged to investigate and monitor their production chains. The SEC later published Rule 13p-1 in 2012 in accordance
with Sec. 1502 to further clarify the requirements for industries to follow
106

Schwartz & Nelson, supra note 101, at 289.
Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128. 111th Cong. (2009).
108 Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation, HARVARD BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE 105, 108 (2012).
109 Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
110 Taylor, supra note 108, at 108.
111 See Sec. 1502, supra note 92.
107
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(the “SEC Final Rule”).112 The nuances of the SEC Final Rule are not directly relevant to this article but the disclosure procedure covered that issuers have to abide by can be summarized as follows:
Just as the legislation instructs, under the SEC rules the first step is
for companies to determine whether conflict minerals are necessary
to their products. If not, companies need not file anything. If a company does make use of conflict minerals, however, it is required to
conduct a so-called “reasonable country of origin inquiry” (an
“RCOI”) with respect thereto. If the RCOI does not reveal the presence of conflict minerals from the Congo region, the company need
only file a Form SD, which must “briefly” describe the company’s
RCOI process and its conclusion. The company also needs to post
this information on its website. If the RCOI reveals that the company
is sourcing conflict minerals from the Congo region or gives the
company reason to believe that this is the case, then the company is
required to conduct due diligence “on the source and chain of custody” of such minerals. If, based on its due diligence, the company determines that its minerals are not actually from the Congo region,
then it must briefly describe its due-diligence efforts, its RCOI, and
its conclusion both on a Form SD and its website.113

This legislation subsequently provoked several controversies: an important issue is whether it is appropriate to have a legal provision that seems
to be a pure CSR mandate under securities laws, requiring companies “to
audit their supply chains as vigorously as they are required to audit their financials.”114 This may indicate that the SEC now bears more responsibility
for and power to meet the provision’s humanitarian and public policy

112 Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing
Use of Conflict Minerals (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1365171484002. For a flowchart summary and detailed explanation of the SEC
Final Rule, see Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,283, 56,285-333 (Sept. 12, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 204.13p-1 & 249b.400).
113 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129, 136
(2016) (footnote omitted). The SEC instructed public companies to make their due diligence
efforts by conforming to such “a nationally or internationally recognized due-diligence
framework” as the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High Risk Areas (“OECD Guidance”). Conflict Minerals,
77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281 n.55; OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (2nd ed. 2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf. As such due diligence efforts
must be audited, the auditor’s role is to “assess whether the auditee is complying with the
OECD Guidance and accurately describing its efforts in its [Conflict Minerals Report].”
Schwartz & Nelson, supra note 101, at 295 (alteration in original).
114 David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 330 (2011).
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aims.115 In a pragmatic sense, whether the goal of the CM rules could be accomplished as designed remains a question, but costs for disclosure and
compliance are thought to be higher than the SEC estimated.116 Moreover,
soon after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, even the EICC and GeSI,
both industry trade groups, expressed concern that the transparency of supply chains is not as highly prioritized as CM rules envisioned in the rule
making.117 The uncertainty of difficulty in disclosures lead to further concerns over threat of Rule 10b-5 liability under security laws.118
Another intriguing issue is that both the violence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo that Sec. 1502 was designed to curb and the foreign
suppliers who would be pressured to comply with the CM rules are respectively taking place and located outside the United States.119 In other words,
Congress envisions that if U.S. businesses are to satisfy the disclosure requirements, an extraterritorial goal will be met indirectly to regulate an entire global supply chain.120 Apparently, according to the purpose of Sec.
1502, this extraterritorial effect is desirable to legislators; as demonstrated
in the Taiwanese case study, it may be an indirect cause of legal transplantation of CM rules into Taiwan through private supply chain channels.121
The filing results from the first-year disclosure effort may respond to
the above query in part. After the first disclosure deadline, a study demonstrated statistics from the filings that around 1,319 companies have filed
Form SDs, fewer than the SEC expected.122 The industries falling within the
115

Id.
Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic
and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1315, 1334 (2012).
117 Id. at 1335.
118 Id. at 1338.
119 Woody, supra note 116, at 1342; Cafaggi, supra note 84 at 1568–70.
120 Woody, supra note 116, at 1342. Under “Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s
New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog,” Congress adopted an indirect approach to assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Specifically,
116

[e]xtraterritorial jurisdiction of section 1502 is indirect in that foreign firms not
registered on an American exchange, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction
of the SEC, may be forced to comply with the provision because they are part of a
supply chain in which the final product is manufactured by an issuing company.
Although outside the reach of any SEC disclosure requirement or liability scheme,
a foreign company may feel the pressure from an issuing company to have an entire supply chain in compliance with section 1502, which may result in foreign
companies rising to meet the standard required by the provision despite not facing
any similar requirements in their home jurisdiction.
Woody, supra note 116, at 1342.
121 See infra Part III.
122 Schwartz, supra note 113, at 144.
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CM rules’ scope mainly include: (1) Semiconductors and Related Devices;
(2) Electro-medical and Electro-therapeutic Apparatuses; (3) Motor Vehicle
Parts and Accessories; (4) Radio and TV Broadcasting and Communications Equipment; (5) Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatuses;
(6) Services-Prepackaged Software; (7) Pharmaceutical Preparations; (8)
Computer Communications Equipment; and (9) Miscellaneous Electrical
Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies.123 Among these businesses, almost
seventy-five percent of those who further filed Conflict Minerals Reports in
addition to their Form SDs mentioned that they had to request information
from their suppliers; however, this was not highly satisfactory.124 A handful
of the reports disclosed the number of CM suppliers, which ranged between
two to more than 40,000, with a median of 510; these figures show the extent to which the supply chains are fragmented, and global buyers rely on
their suppliers to offer information to the SEC.125 Another interesting phenomenon mentioned in the study is how the CFSI audit program has significantly lowered the cost of meeting the disclosure requirements for U.S. issuers by building up a database for certified smelters and refineries.126
Nonetheless, the cost of CFSI audits is quite high for smelters and refineries, highlighting another problem that should not be omitted in the future.127
At any rate, the aforementioned observation may reflect that the third-party
certification or audit process does play a role in promoting compliance with
the state or government-mandated laws for CM disclosure.128
Summary
This article is intended to illustrate the TPR or transnational private
governance of CSR norms through global supply chains in general and to
test whether the U.S. legislators’ expected and desired extraterritorial goal
of Sec. 1502 to indirectly regulate an entire global supply chain can be met
in particular. Using the Taiwanese case study presented in Part III, we will
explore the process of how the following two distinct types of CM rules
might have been transplanted into Taiwan through the private channel of
supply chains: public government-mandated CSR standards under the
Dodd-Frank Act, and private voluntary CSR standards written by the EICC.
Although Taiwanese industries do not directly face any similar domestic rules or requirements on CM disclosures, because Taiwan’s high-tech
industries have been very much involved in transnational transactions and
outsourcing, they may perform a crucial role in the legal transplantation of
123

Id. at 145.
Id. at 150.
125 Id. at 150-51.
126 Id. at 173-74.
127 Id. at 169.
128 See supra Part I.
124
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CM rules through global supply chains. In addition to those Taiwanese
firms that are already EICC members129 or are listed on the U.S. stock market so as to become public issuers (and are thus subject to the jurisdiction of
the SEC as well as Sec. 1502),130 other companies may also need to comply
with related CM rules in that they are part of a supply chain where final
products are manufactured by a U.S. issuer subject to Sec. 1502 under securities laws, or that they may feel pressure from such voluntary rules as the
EICC Code of Conduct owing to their buyers (who might be EICC members and thus form an entire supply chain, in compliance with this private
standard). Obviously, there are a certain number of Taiwanese suppliers in
the electronics industry who have already voluntarily declared that they do
not use CMs within their supply chains or have made such disclosures on
their websites.131
129 See EICC, supra note 103. For example, Hon Hai Precision Industry Company Limited (“Hon Hai,” also as known as Foxconn) is a renowned high-tech company incorporated
in Taiwan. In 2005, Foxconn “[b]ecame a member of Electronic Industry Code of Conduct
(EICC), dedicated to promoting corporate social and environmental responsibilities (hereinafter referred to as SER).” See Hon Hai/Company Milestones, FOXCONN Technology Group,
Company Milestones, TECH. GRP., http://www.foxconn.com/
GroupProfile_En/CompanyMilestones.html (last visited Jul. 8, 2016). As discussed in Part
I.C, Foxconn is Apple Inc.’s main supplier; although it is headquartered in Taiwan, its major
factories are located in China.
130 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd. (TSMC) is also an EICC member. See EICC, supra note 103. TSMC securities are registered with the SEC and listed on
the New York Stock Exchange as well. Corporate Governance, TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR
Manufacturing Company Limited, Corporate Governance,MFG. CO. LTD., http://www.tsmc.
com/english/investorRelations/corporate_governance.htm (last visited Jul. 8, 2016).
131 For example, Sunrex Technology Co., Ltd. (Sunrex) is a laptop computer keyboard
manufacturer listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Company Overview, SUNREX TechnologyTECH. CO., LTD.,
Company Overview,
http://www.sunrex.com.tw/en/aboutdetail.php?id=5 (last visited Jul. 15, 2016). Sunrex has published a “Statement of Prohibition
Regarding Usage of Metals from Congo’s Illegal Mines” on its website, emphasizing that:

The social and environmental problems caused by Congo’s illegal mining areas
have attracted the attention of Sunrex’s customers. In response to customer demands and to fulfill our corporate social and environmental responsibilities, Sunrex has requested that its suppliers from the metals supply chain bear the following
responsibilities: 01. Do not use metals from illegal mines or mines where mining
operations are performed under poor working conditions. 02. Request upstream
suppliers to not use metals from illegal mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 03. Look back on all products that contain “blood mineral” metals, such as
gold (Au), palladium (Pd), tantalum (Ta), tin (Sn), and tungsten (W), to identify
the mining areas where these metals came from. 04. Work with Sunrex and Sunrex’s customers to investigate the source of metals to ensure that metals originating
from illegal mining areas are not used.
Sunrex TechnologyConflict Minerals, SUNREX TECH. CO., LTD., http://www.sunrex.com.tw/
en/csr-detail.php?id=4 (last visited Jul. 15, 2016).
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IV.

CONFLICT MINERALS DISCLOSURES IN GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAINS: THE CASE OF TAIWAN
According to the TPR theory,132 some Taiwanese industries may be
examples of private actors under its conceptual framework. Also, if we take
into account the role played by Taiwanese manufacturers, transnational
supply contracts may become a channel for voluntary codes of conduct or
foreign government-mandated laws to transfer into Taiwan, exerting influences on Taiwanese manufacturers even without formal legal transplantation of CSR standards such as CM rules initiated by the government. Therefore, the aforementioned CM rules, whether voluntary or foreigngovernment-mandated, may also generate a kind of “legal transplant” effect
through supply chains as a medium of TPR. In Part III.B below, this article
takes Taiwanese industries as an example: Through surveying a portion of
Taiwanese suppliers, we can understand whether they are currently engaging in CM investigations or disclosures, their incentives to abide by the CM
rules, and the approaches they take. The Taiwanese case study would thus
provide another example for legal transplantation through global supply
chains in a globalized world.
Study Design
The main questions we seek to resolve through this empirical study
are: 1. In terms of transplanted objects, although there are currently no government-mandated laws related to CMs in Taiwan, is any firm in Taiwan
actually required to comply with any type of CM rules? 2. In terms of
transplant processes or channels, have any legal transplants of CM rules
through supply chains in Taiwan already occurred?
In order to answer these questions, we conducted a survey on a group
of Taiwanese businesses using a pre-designed questionnaire. The questionnaires were filled out anonymously. Because there is a lack of similar studies on this specific topic (focusing on legal transplants through supply contracts with CM rules as an example), this study was designed as a pilot
study. Due to limited resources, we did not take a census of the entirety of
Taiwanese industries. We sent out the questionnaires with the help from the
Supply Management Institute, Taiwan (“SMIT”), an NGO with members
from many Taiwanese industries; SMIT helped us send the questionnaires
to their trainee members.133 Most of the individual respondents worked
132

See supra Part I.
The SMIT is an NGO whose main business is to provide professional training courses
and supply management information for company procurement as well as to host related
seminars or conferences. Since its creation in November 1992, “SMIT has trained more than
5,000 purchasing and supply management professionals.” About SMIT, SUPPLY
MANAGEMENT MGMT. INST., TAIWAN, http://www.smit.org.tw/EN/ugC_AboutUs.asp (last
visited Jul. 17, 2016).
133
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within the procurement department. In this approach, we also contacted respondents from a wide range of industries as well as in different positions
within supply chains (e.g., upstream, midstream, or downstream). Before
the formal survey, we did a pilot test on a group of targeted respondents in
order to polish our questions.
Here is the main structure of the questionnaires. Including the core
question “whether the business for which the respondents work is involved
in conflict minerals investigations or disclosures and why,” we designed
several groups of questions as follows:
1. The position where the respondent’s business was within the supply chain. We asked about the basic company information (industry, position in the supply chain, whether their shares are publicly
listed in Taiwan or in the United States), in order to group respondents into categories and to gain a basic understanding of their
positons located in the supply chains.
2. Whether the respondent took any actions related to CM disclosures, including merely conducting CM investigations or making
follow-up disclosures in addition to the investigations, and, if so,
the reason why the business in question did so. We also asked
those businesses already taking relevant actions and the businesses
that did not do so in order to understand the incentives/motivations
for taking action (or deciding not to).
A. For businesses conducting CM investigations: There are two
groups of questions (although the grouping was not revealed in
the questionnaires):
i.
The “incentive” group, including questions relevant to
incentives to conduct CM investigations (e.g., whether
they were required to by their buyers), and which applicable non-domestic rules were applied.
ii.
The “investigative approach” group, including questions
relevant to how the respondent actually conducted CM
investigations: whether there was any standard or methodology they applied, the personnel inside companies in
charge of conducting CM investigations, etc.
B. For businesses not yet conducting CM investigations: We asked
why they did not do so and whether they might take action in the
future.
The questions in the questionnaires were multiple choice, except for
the final question, which was open for further opinions. Some questions had
an “other” option, which was designed to identify any other applicable
standards or investigative methodologies. The questionnaire is outlined in
Table 2, while its complete content is presented in Appendix A.
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Table 2: Outline of the Questionnaire
Section
Background information
(respondent—their companies)

Questions in this section
Business scale, industries, core products,
position in the supply chain (in respective
industries), whether their shares are listed in
the Taiwanese or U.S. stock markets
Background information Position and duration of employment in the
(respondent—personally)
company
For businesses
The “incentive” group:
conducting CM
The time and the incentive for the business
investigations or taking
to conduct CM investigations, and any apother relevant actions
plicable government-mandated laws or
transnational voluntary codes of conduct
The “investigative approach” group:
Company department in charge of CM investigations, the adopted investigative approach, personnel involved, methodologies
applied, the main buyer’s nationality, the
time consumed during the first investigation, and any obstacles encountered
For businesses not yet
Main reason for not conducting a CM invesconducting CM
tigation, the reason for disclosure (albeit
investigations
without CM investigation, if applicable),
and the future possibility of conducting a
CM investigation
Other opinions
Respondents may give any opinion on actions not included in the questionnaire
For the background information section, we referred to the classification of respective industries formulated by the Taiwan Stock Exchange and
Taipei Exchange134 to make a list to define the respective industries and illustrate businesses within the respective streams of supply chains, as shown
in Table 3, from which the respondents could select. We grouped together
those industries that were more likely to be associated with CMs. As to the
“others” group, we were still able to see the distribution within industries
according to respondents’ answers of core products. As for the business
size, we used the standard set by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs
(“MOEA”) to classify respondents into small- and medium-sized enterpris-

134 The Information Platform on Industrial Value Chains, TAIWAN STOCK EXCH. & TAIPEI
EXCH., http://ic.gretai.org.tw/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
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es (“SMEs”) and non-SMEs.135
Table 3: Industry Classification
Examples of businesses in
respective industrial groups
Industries
Upstream
Midstream
A. SemiIP or IC
IC/wafer manuconductors
design
facturing, manufacturing process,
testing
facilities, and
chemicals
B. PCBs
Materials, base Base-plate manmaterials, manu- ufacturing or asfacturing pro- sembly
cess, and
testing facilities
C. Communica- Components
N/A
tion
manufacturing
D. Computers

Manufacturing
N/A
of
Hardware
(e.g.,
motherboards or/and
disk drives),

Downstream
Assembly
and testing

N/A

Consumer
products
manufacturing
Consumer
products manufacturing

135 Zhong Xiao Qi Ye Ren Ding Biao Zhun (2009 Xiu Gai) [Standards for Identifying
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (2009 Revisions) (Taiwan)], art. 2 (2009) [hereinafter
SME Standards]. As we did the survey before the March 2015 amendment of SME Standards, we primarily applied the old pre-amendment version of SME Standards as follows:

The term “SME” as used in the Standards shall mean an enterprise which has
completed company registration or business registration in accordance with the requirements of the laws, and which conforms to the following standards: (1) The
enterprise is an enterprise in the manufacturing, construction, mining or quarrying
industry with either paid-in capital of NT$80 million or less, or fewer than 200
regular employees. (2) The enterprise is an enterprise in the industry other than any
of those mentioned in the Sub-paragraph immediately above with either its sales
revenue of NT$100 million or less in the previous year, or fewer than 100 regular
employees.
Id.
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E. Flat panel
display

F. Electric
machinery
G. Solar energy

H. Others

including electrical
components such as
passive components
Chemicals or
components
such as LEDs
and
touch-panels
Components
(e.g., hydraulic
components)

Modules of
touch panels,
suppliers for
manufacturing
process and
testing facilities
N/A

Consumer
products manufacturing

Metal
processing
and
machine manufacturing
Materials or sili- Solar batteries Solar
plant/
con-wafer man- and
modules powerufacturing
manufacturing
generating
equipment
To be answered by the respondent

Before formally sending the questionnaires out, we did a pilot test on a
small group of respondents from SMIT’s members in order to see if the design and wording of the questionnaires fit our purpose. We modified the
questions and information provided in the questionnaires according to the
results of the pilot test, including the industry classification as shown in Table 3, which is the final version. We mainly modified descriptions for respondents to more easily locate their groups.
Analysis of Survey Results
In this part we attempted an analysis of narrative statistics based on the
survey data we collected from the respondents.136 We sent out online questionnaires to 1,200 respondents, set the collection period as one month, and
received a final response rate of approximately 15.4 percent (i.e., 185 respondents replied to our questions). What follows are the survey results
from the respondents.
136Because we were only concerned about those companies that were represented in each
response, although we did ask some questions with respect to the personal information of the
individuals who filled out the questionnaires, in the current analysis the term “respondent”
generally denotes the company represented in each response.
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Responses on the Current Status of CM Actions
The first group of questions to be answered was whether any of the respondents are currently taking any actions related to the issue of CMs. The
responses are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: The Responses Regarding Taking CM-Related Actions.

U.S.
listed
Others
(i.e.,
nonU.S.listed)
All

Taking any action
(including conducting CM
investigations without
follow-up disclosure and
making relevant
disclosures in addition to
ex ante investigations)
12 (21%)

Not conducting CM
investigations (including
making disclosures without ex
ante investigations and not
taking any actions at all)

46 (79%)

118 (93%)

58 (100%)

127 (100%)

9 (7%)

Among all the responses, 58 respondents (31.4 percent) answered that
their companies have carried out CM investigations to some extent; this
group can be further divided into those that conducted investigations and
then publicly disclosed CM related information and those that only conducted CM investigations without follow-up disclosure. The remaining twothirds of the respondents have not conducted any CM investigations at all,
which will be discussed later in this part.137
For the purposes of the study, we mainly focused on the responses
from Taiwanese businesses that neither listed their shares nor were public
issuers on the U.S. stock market; this group of 46 out of the 58 respondents
answered that the companies have been taking actions, including CM investigations or disclosures. As discussed throughout this article, this group is
referred to as the “action group.” The reason for focusing on this group of
46 respondents was that theoretically they were not directly subject to any
state law requiring them to carry out CM due diligence or disclosure, so
their incentives to obey relevant CM rules turned out to be more intriguing.
The incentives and practices of actions related to CMs taken by the action
137
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group of 46 respondents (i.e., the cell highlighted in grey in Table 4) were
then analyzed from the perspective of legal transplantation through private
contracting; they may account for two of the four categories under the legal
transplant matrix of CSR standards as introduced in Table 1 (viz. Categories 2 and 4).138
General Characteristics of the Respondents
Despite the limitations of the study approach,139 we tried to compare
the characteristics of the groups that conducted CM investigations (the action group) with those of the group that did not (the no-action group).
Numbers and proportions of industries within each group are shown in Table 5. For the action group, the single largest group was the computer industry, comprising about 29.3 percent; electric machinery was the second,
comprising about 19 percent; the third and fourth were semiconductors and
PCBs, comprising 13.8 and 12.1 percent, respectively. Although the numbers of these “top” industries were not necessarily larger than their counterparts in the no-action group, these proportions in the action group still
showed that these industries were more likely to take action, compared to
the other industries from which the respondents came. Eleven respondents
were in the “others” group, distributed across different industries; according
to the core products they said that they marketed or produced, they came
from industries such as tourist/amusement enterprises, other manufacturing
industries, retail, education, aviation, transportation, medicine, and medical
equipment.
When it came to business size, Table 6 shows that in the action group,
32.8 percent of the respondents were SMEs, while 67.2 percent were larger
companies. In contrast, in the no-action group, there was less difference in
size between larger companies and SMEs, which were 48 percent and 52
percent, respectively. This suggests that, among the respondents, larger
companies are more likely to take CM-related actions, regardless of the reason.

138
139

See supra Part I.
See infra Part III.
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Table 5: Numbers and Proportions of Industries within the Same
Group
Industry
A. Semiconductors
B. PCBs
C. Communication
D. Computers
E. Flat panel
displays
F. Electric machinery
G. Solar energy
H. Others
Sum

Action group
Responses Proportion

No-action group
Responses Proportion

8

13.8%

10

7.9%

7
1

12.1%
1.7%

4
1

3.1%
0.8%

17
2

29.3%
3.4%

15
3

11.8%
2.4%

11

19.0%

16

12.6%

1
11
58

1.7%
19.0%
100.0%

9
69
127

7.1%
54.3%
100.0%

Table 6: The Business Sizes of the Respondents
Action group
Scale
Responses
Proportion
SMEs
19
32.8%
Others (i.e.,
39
67.2%
Larger
entities)
Sum
58
100.0%

No-action group
Responses
Proportion
52.0%
66
48.0%
61
127

100.0%

After this preliminary analysis, we turned our focus to the action group
to further explore their incentives for and approaches to conducting CM investigations or taking further actions. This revealed any traits illustrating
the legal transplantation through global supply chains.
Incentives for Conducting CM Investigations
The “incentive” group of questions included Question 3 under Section
II of the questionnaire, “The General Approach to ‘Conflict Minerals Disclosure’ in Your Company” (the incentive for conducting CM investigations for the first time) and the subordinate questions following Question 3,
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“What were the laws or rules to follow, if any?” (Question 3a), “Which
country was the major buyer from?” (Question 3b), “If the investigations
were required by the buyer, did the buyer offer any assistance?” (Question
3c), and “Were these requirements written into supply contracts?” (Question 3d). The main goal of the aforementioned questions in this group was
to understand the incentive for the action group to take such CM-related actions and whether and how the legal transplantation of CM rules such as
government-mandated laws (e.g., the U.S. laws, standing for Category 2 in
Table 1) or transnational voluntary codes of conduct (e.g., the EICC Code
of Conduct, representing Category 4 in Table 1) occurred.140
As shown in Table 7 below, we focused on the incentives and practices
of CM-related actions taken by the action group of 46 respondents who
were not U.S.-listed (i.e., the cell highlighted in grey in Table 4).141 Within
this non-U.S.-listed action group, the most common incentive to take action
to comply with CM rules was “being directly required to by their buyers,”
as reported by about 65.2 percent of the respondents (30 responses). Other
respondents reported that they conducted CM investigations to comply with
standards they had adopted themselves long before (6.5 percent); to follow
the market trend of their buyers in advance (21.8 percent); or to take the initiative without being required to or following a trend (6.5 percent). As for
the standards with which they complied, almost all respondents answered
either the EICC rules or U.S. laws (i.e., Sec. 1502). Specifically, for the respondents whose incentive was “to comply with standards they had adopted
themselves long before,” two respondents complied with EICC rules and
one with U.S. law (to which they were not legally subject). For those whose
incentive was to “follow the market trend of their buyers in advance,” eight
respondents complied with EICC rules and two with U.S. laws. Furthermore, for those whose incentive was “being directly required to by their
buyers,” 19 respondents complied with EICC rules and 11 with U.S. laws.

140
141

See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.

267

02. TSAI&WU - CONFLICT MINERAL RULES AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2018 11:57 AM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

38:233 (2018)

Table 7: The Incentives for the Non-U.S.-Listed Action Group
Number of responses
EICC
U.S. laws
Investigating to 2 (6.9%)
1 (7.1%)
comply
with standards
long adopted
by themselves
Investigating to 8 (27.6%) 2 (14.3%)
follow
market trend
of buyers in
advance
Being directly 19
11 (78.6%)
required to by (65.5％)
their buyers
Taking initia- N/A
N/A
tives in
investigations
without being
required to or
following the
trend
Sum
29
14 (100.0%)
(100.0%)
Incentive

Others
0 (0%)

Sum
3 (6.5%)

0 (0%)

10 (21.8%)

0 (0%)

30 (65.2%)

3
(100.0%)

3 (6.5%)

3
(100.0%)

46 (100.0%)

According to the responses shown in Table 7, the most common motivation for the respondents to conduct CM investigations was “being directly
required to by their buyers”; the EICC rules were also more commonly followed than Sec. 1502. This result might be due to the fact that the main industries influenced by CM rules (such as electronics and relevant industries) are possibly EICC members themselves, or suppliers of EICC
members, thus making it easier for those buyers to continue applying the
EICC Code of Conduct when requiring Taiwanese suppliers to conduct CM
investigations. Obviously, EICC rules have already become the more prevalent standard for the respondents, even though they are only a set of transnational voluntary codes.
In terms of the nationalities of their buyers for the respondents’ core
products, the results for the non-U.S.-listed action group are shown in Table
8.
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Table 8: Nationalities of the Buyers of the Non-U.S.-Listed Action
Group
Nationalities of the buyers for the respondents’ core products
Foreign
Taiwanese
Sum
2 (6.9%)
0
2 (6.2%)

Incentives
Investigating to
follow the market
trend of their
buyers in advance
Being required to by 27 (93.1%)
their buyers
Sum
29 (100.0%)

3 (100%)

30 (93.8%)

3 (100%)

32 (100%)

Table 8 shows that for those directly required by their buyers to conduct CM investigations, or those actively doing so to follow the market
trend of their buyers in advance, most of their buyers were foreign businesses.
Overall, according to the responses from the non-U.S.-listed action
group, a large proportion of them took CM-related actions to meet their
buyers’ requests; also, most of their buyers were foreign businesses. These
responses imply that the respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action group
conducted CM investigations under pressure passed on through supply
chains, resulting in Taiwanese companies actually complying with CM
rules despite not actually having to do so initially. Under the legal transplant matrix of CSR standards (as shown in Table 1),142 if these Taiwanese
companies complied with Sec. 1502, then this could be an example of Category 2 (such public standards as government-mandated laws transposing
through supply contracts). For those complying with the EICC Code of
Conduct, this could illustrate Category 4 (private, voluntary standards transferring through supply contracts).
With regard to how those respondents as suppliers interacted with their
buyers, in the questionnaires we added further questions for those whose
incentives were “directly required to by their buyers” (the 30 respondents
out of the non-U.S.-listed action group). These questions were designed to
give us a basic understanding of the interactions between suppliers and
buyers, in order to make comparisons with prior studies.143
The answers from the 30 respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action
group that were required by their buyers to conduct CM investigations are
142
143

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
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listed in Table 9 below. We found that the most common method of requiring compliance was to put the requirements into supply contracts; this result
is a little bit different from that of a past study that suggested that requirements expressed in “soft” form or informal arrangements were common. 144
However, it is also true that not all suppliers were strictly and expressly required to conduct CM investigations.
Table 9: Whether Requirements on CM Investigations Were Written
into Supply Contracts
Form of requirements
Respondents
No, only orally required
4 (1.3%)
Especially written into relevant contracts
16 (53.3%)
Not clear
8 (26.7%)
Not able to answer
2 (6.7%)
Sum
30 (100.0%)
As shown in Table 10, for those 30 respondents from the non-U.S.listed action group that were required by their buyers to conduct CM investigations, as to the question of whether they received any help from their
buyers, most of the responses (23 responses) indicated that the buyers provided technical documents for reference; one of them said their buyer provided useful training; two of them said the buyers provided a great deal of
practical assistance during investigations; and seven respondents stated that
they did not receive any form of help at all.
Table 10: Whether the Buyers Offered Any Support in CM Investigations145
The extent of support

Respondents

Not at all
The buyers provided technical documents for reference
The buyers provided useful training
The buyers provided much practical assistance during
investigations

7
23
1
2

Overall, some buyers provided support in CM investigations to some
extent, but it was more common for them to offer technical documents for
144

McBarnet & Kurkchiyan, supra note 73, at 68-70.
regard to this question, the respondents were permitted to choose plural answers,
and so we have not provided percentages for each response.
145With
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reference only. For those respondents surveyed in Table 10, it was not
common for their buyers to cooperate with suppliers in conducting CM investigations intensively. This result could be a supplement to actual practices of CM investigations.
Investigative Approaches
The questions dealing with the investigative approaches taken by the
action group start with Question 4. This set of questions provided additional
information about actual investigative practices.
Investigative Tools
Question 4 in the questionnaire (please see the Appendix) asked what
tools were to be adopted, and Question 4a asked why the respondents had
adopted these tools in CM investigations. The reason for these questions is
that we supposed the methodologies underlying more frequently used tools
would probably form a set of CM-related standards to follow in the future.146 The results are shown in Table 11. The most popular tool for CM
investigations seems to be the toolkit devised by the EICC. However, some
suppliers also developed their own tools rather than relying on general
measures.
As for the reasons to adopt the tools shown in Table 12, the most
common answer was “being designated by the buyers”; next was “starting
to adopt tools themselves after being required to conduct CM investigations” and then “complying by using currently adopted tools.” This result
shows that it might be common for buyers to directly designate the tools to
be used. This seems to be understandable if we take into account that the
most common incentive for those respondents to take CM-related actions
was “being directly required to by their buyers,” as shown in Table 7. 147
Therefore, it can be inferred that the investigative tools directly designated
by the buyers are also passed on through supply chains. In addition, Table
11 might suggest that the EICC-devised toolkit was adopted more prevalently than the OECD Guidance, which the SEC recommended to U.S. publicly traded companies under Sec. 1502.148 This phenomenon is similar to
the case demonstrated in Table 7, where respondents were more likely to
follow EICC rules than Sec. 1502. Overall, this further indicates that private
CM standards written by industries themselves (such as the EICC Code of
Conduct and its investigative toolkit) in a bottom-up approach may prove
146 As discussed above in Part II, even though CM rules require disclosure by regulated
companies about the use of 3TG minerals in their manufacturing processes, there is still
room for the regulated to choose actual tools or methodologies in conducting CM investigations.
147 See supra Part III.
148 See supra Part II.
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more popular than public standards such as state laws enacted by a foreign
government (such as Sec. 1502 and the OECD Guidance suggested by the
SEC) in a top-down approach.
Table 11: Tools Adopted
Tools or methodologies
EICC-related investigative tools
OECD Due Diligence Guidance149
Self-devised tools
Others
Sum
Table 12: Reasons for Adoption

Respondents
30 (65.2%)
4 (8.7%)
9 (19.6%)
3 (6.5%)
46 (100%)

Reasons
Respondents
Complying by using currently adopted tools
10 (21.7%)
Starting to adopt tools themselves after being required to conduct CM investigations
13 (28.3%)
Being designated by the buyers
23 (50.0%)
Sum
46 (100%)
Investigative Practices
This group of questions included Questions 5 and 7–10. The questions
in this group were designed to give us a better understanding of CM investigative practices and some knowledge of the costs of complying with CM
rules.
We first asked those 46 respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action
group150 whether they did so annually; their answers are shown in Table 13
below. Most respondents in our survey have conducted CM investigations,
but few did it annually. This is probably due to the few changes in their
manufacturing processes.

149

As discussed in Part II.C, the SEC suggested that U.S. issuing companies concentrate
their due diligence efforts by conforming to the OECD Guidance. Therefore, one of the options enumerated in Table 11 is the OECD Guidance.
150 See supra Part III.
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Table 13: Were CM Investigations Repeated Annually?
Repeated annually?
Yes
CM investigations are repeated but not conducted
annually
No, the same set of data previously collected was
used again
Sum151

Respondents
9 (20%)
23 (51.1%)
13 (28.9%)
45 (100%)

When it comes to how they carried out CM investigations, the most
common answer, as shown in Table 14 below, was to conduct CM investigations by employees within the company themselves, instead of seeking
professional support from outside the company. However, as shown in Table 15 below, the most common way to satisfy the requirement to carry out
CM investigations was to require their suppliers to report according to the
required format of investigative tools.
The aforementioned phenomena suggest that most of the suppliers in
the action group were not at the final end of the supply chains. Hence it
could be less costly for them to pass on investigative tasks to their suppliers. However, this approach also implies that the requirements regarding
CM investigations have been passed on through supply chains, meaning
that CM rules could further influence respondents’ suppliers even if they
only supplied production materials to the respondents.
Table 14: The CM Investigative Approach (I)
Who conducted CM investigations?
All conducted by employees within the company
Working with third-party professionals, e.g. accounting
firms
Carried out by third-party professionals
Sum

Respondents
39 (84.8%)
4 (8.7%)
3 (6.5%)
46 (100%)

151 There should have been 46 responses, but because one respondent did not answer this
question, we have counted only 45 responses here.
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Table 15: The CM Investigative Approach (II)
Actual implementation
Tracking all the information by the department in charge
of conducting CM investigations
Only requesting the information from the suppliers
Both
Others
Sum

Respondents
2 (4.3%)
39 (84.8%)
4 (8.7%)
1 (2.2%)
46 (100)

Tables 16 and 17 (as asked in Questions 8 and 8a, respectively) report
which department within a company is responsible for conducting CM investigations and how they do so. The data collected from the respondents
indicated that most would not continually assign personnel exclusively for
CM investigations and that the investigations were mostly carried out by the
departments of procurement and supply chain management. Possibly because these two departments are on the frontline in terms of communicating
with their own suppliers, they are assigned the responsibility of addressing
CM issues.
Table 16: Whether There Are Personnel Exclusively Assigned for CM
Investigations
Personnel Exclusively Assigned
Respondents
Yes, and CM investigations are continually conducted by the same personnel
17 (37.0%)
Yes, but on an ad hoc basis
14 (30.4%)
No
15 (32.6%)
Sum
46 (100%)
Table 17: The Department in Charge of Conducting CM Investigations
Department
Procurement
Supply chain management
Legal
CSR
Others
Sum
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Respondents
19 (41.3%)
9 (19.6%)
4 (8.7%)
5 (10.9%)
9 (19.6%)
46 (100%)
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Table 18: Time Spent on CM Investigations
Time spent
1-2 weeks
2-4 weeks
4-8 weeks
8 weeks or more
Sum

Respondents
6 (13%)
18 (39.1%)
14 (30.4%)
8 (17.4%)
46 (100%)

According to Table 18 (as asked in Question 9), in terms of the time
spent if the assigned personnel were carrying out CM investigations for the
first time, most respondents replied that it took more than two weeks to
conduct CM investigations, or even more than four weeks. This might be
because the information required is not ordinary information managed by
most companies, and therefore more time is spent tracking down these details.
In Questions 10 and 6, respectively, we also asked about difficulties in
conducting CM investigations (Table 19) and whether the investigations
caused the respondents to institute any changes (Table 20). Their answers
showed that the more common problems were the difficulties in tracking
the origins of supplied materials and in obtaining cooperation from suppliers, and the lack of resources to complete the investigations. Compared with
the survey results presented in Table 15 above—that the most common way
to satisfy the requirements for carrying out CM investigations is to rely on
suppliers to offer information—it is evident that the difficulty in obtaining
cooperation from suppliers was a key issue affecting whether respondents
completed the investigations. This result seems to be consistent with the US
study that a deficiency in suppliers’ cooperation in providing information is
a common issue for US publicly traded companies that are subject to Sec.
1502.152

152

Schwartz, supra note 113, at 150.
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Table 19: Any Difficulties in Conducting CM Investigations153
Form of difficulties
Difficulty in obtaining cooperation from the suppliers
Lack of resources to complete the investigations
Difficulty in tracking the origins of supplied materials
or the high cost of doing so
No special difficulties
Others

Responses
22
16
26
12
1

Table 20 presents the responses to the question of whether there would
be any changes to the respondents’ internal operation after CM investigations (as asked in Question 6 in the questionnaire). Although most respondents did not change their suppliers, they still required their suppliers to help
them comply with CM rules in the future or indicated that they would modify their systems for supply chain management. These results suggest that
the respondents’ upstream suppliers still need to change their practices to
meet their buyers’ requests to help comply with CM rules, or work with
their buyers to carry out CM investigations and disclosures. This could indicate that the regulatory effects of CM rules may continue being passed on
through supply chains in the upstream direction.
Table 20: Any Changes to Internal Operation after CM Investigations154
Changes
Suppliers are unchanged, but will further be required to
provide CM-free materials
Adjusting systems for supply chain management within
the company
Providing more training on the CM issues
Suppliers changed
No changes
Others

153
154
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Responses
29
7
6
3
10
0

The respondents were permitted to choose plural answers for this question.
The respondents were permitted to choose plural answers for this question.
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The No Action Group
With regard to the group not conducting CM investigations, we asked
why they did not take action and the possibility of future action. As shown
in Table 4,155 127 respondents answered that they did not conduct any CM
investigations at all. In the no-action group, however, three respondents answered that they just made disclosures without ex ante investigations (as
asked in Question 11a). As we are more interested in why the respondents
did not carry out any CM investigations at all, we excluded these three respondents from the statistics in Table 21, leaving 124 respondents’ replies
(as asked in Question 11).
Nevertheless, these three respondents who made disclosures without
ex ante CM investigations replied that their products did not use any materials that involved CMs, and that this was why they did not carry out such
investigations. This raised the question of why they still made the related
disclosure (as asked in Question 11a). One replied that they did so because
they were asked by the buyers to make nominal disclosures, while another
stated that they did so merely to follow a previously adopted standard.
These answers, albeit few in number, imply that even though businesses believe that their products do not involve CMs, they may still need to comply
with CM rules to an extent.
Table 21 below summarizes the reasons why other respondents did not
carry out CM investigations. The most common reason offered (no matter
which industries the respondent was involved in) was never being required
to do so. The second most common reason was that their products cannot
contain CMs. However, five respondents said they would like to conduct
the investigations but had no resources with which to do so. Among the respondents who cited “other reasons,” one revealed that their suppliers were
all large international buyers who had already made CM disclosures themselves. In other words, even though there were respondents that had not yet
conducted any investigation, some of them actually felt pressure to, but this
pressure was not as strong as that placed on the action group.

155

See supra Part III.
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Table 21: Reasons for No Action
Reasons
Never being required to conduct CM investigations
The products cannot contain CMs
Products could be CM-related but possessing no resources to conduct CM investigations
Others
Sum

Respondents
75 (60.5%)
35 (28.2%)
5 (4.0%)
9 (7.3%)
124 (100%)

Research Limitations on Interpreting the Results
Although we tried our best to strike a balance between research resources and meaningful results, due to the limitation of the research design,
we have to acknowledge that there may be more work to do if the results
are to be generalizable to all Taiwanese industries. As we did not take a
census of all Taiwanese industries, some of the results, e.g., the ratios of industries involved or the common reasons for taking CM-related actions,
cannot be taken as representative of whole industries. The second limitation
was that because we did not have a fully detailed analysis of the general
characteristics of the respondents (e.g., the actual numbers of businesses in
each industry for the 185 respondents), we were not able to directly compare the numbers and ratios we collected for whole industries in Taiwan.
Neither were we able to determine if there was any difference between the
respondents that replied to the questionnaires and those who did not; for example, there was no way to know if, had the former been more familiar with
CM issues, they would have been more willing to answer the questionnaires
than the latter.
Nonetheless, because the main goal of this article was to conduct a pilot or pioneering study to provide rudimentary evidence of the legal transplantation of CM rules of the two public and private types through private
supply chain channels, the research limitations mentioned above might not
constitute serious hindrances with regard to the main goal of this article.
Summary
Under the theoretical framework built with the role played by private
governance in the context of the cross-border legal transplantation of CSR
standards, Part III uses a Taiwanese case study to discuss the legal transplantation of CM rules (including government-mandated laws and transnational voluntary codes) through private contracting in a globalized world.
This case study suggests a couple of noteworthy phenomena.
First, to address the concerns regarding CMs, there are two kinds of
CM rules in play in regulating CM use: transnational voluntary codes, such
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as the EICC Code of Conduct, and government-mandated laws, such as
Sec. 1502 under the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. The creation of both CM rules
could be attributed to the promotion of such concerns by the UN and the
OECD.156
Second, when it comes to regulatory influence on suppliers in global
supply chains, Sec. 1502 and the SEC Final Rule are government-mandated
laws, which can be really binding on U.S. issuing companies. As for U.S.
buyers’ suppliers in other jurisdictions or countries around the world, it is
more common for them to act under compliance pressure from the EICC
Code of Conduct or other voluntary soft rules. In other words, in the international market for CM rules, the EICC might perform a more active role
than Sec. 1502, which was reflected in the Taiwanese case study, a majority
of the respondents complied with the EICC, whether directly or indirectly.
Therefore, what distinguishes this article from previous work is that
the Taiwanese case study could imply that Taiwanese suppliers complied
with the CM rules developed by the EICC to a greater extent than those enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act (including the SEC Final Rule and the
OECD Guidance, suggested by the SEC as a toolkit for carrying out due
diligence). When it comes to adopting or implementing transnational CSR
standards in suppliers’ countries through private contracting in global supply chains, this study could suggest that private standards developed by the
industries themselves or NGOs in a bottom-up approach might be more effective or widely acceptable than public or state laws enacted by a foreign
government in a top-down approach. This might be proof that private
standards can sometimes be more effective or widely acceptable in regulating MNEs when voluntary codes established by private organizations compete with public or regulatory laws.157 It is also an illustration of transnational private governance of CSR standards in general, or private
implementation and enforcement of CM rules under global supply chains in
particular.
Furthermore, more than half of the respondents from the non-U.S.listed action group answered that they adopted the investigative tools assigned by their buyers, and those tools might therefore constitute a quasistandard followed widely within supply chains. This might suggest that the
buyers, by designating investigative tools for their suppliers to use, could
have the ability to decide the actual approach or methodology used to comply with CM rules in supply chains collectively.
Finally, most respondents from the non-U.S.-listed action group further required their own upstream suppliers to provide information to help
meet their buyers’ requirements in conducting CM investigations. In other
words, these respondents might further pass on CM rules to other upstream
156
157

See supra Part II.
See Wielsch, supra note 54, at 1076-77.
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Taiwanese or foreign suppliers, thus extending the regulatory reach of applicable CM rules along supply chains.
V.
CONCLUSION
There are two significant findings in terms of the transplant process/channels and transplanted objects. First, as demonstrated in Table 1
(the matrix for the legal transplantation of CSR standards), the legal transplant literature typically focuses on legal transplants through public or governmental channels (i.e., Categories 1 and 3).158 This article, however, deals
with an emerging phenomenon: legal transplants through private contracting in global supply chains.159 Private actors have transplanted a variety of
private and public laws or standards across jurisdictions through private
contracting over the last few decades. By looking into how Taiwanese suppliers have made transparency efforts to help their buyers comply with CM
rules established by the transnational electronics industry themselves and by
the U.S. government respectively, in this article we argue that CSR codes of
conduct vividly exemplify this type of legal transplantation through private
channels, such as contractual control in global supply chains (please see
Categories 2 and 4 in Table 1). Specifically, by examining legal transplants
through private contracting in a globalized world, this article assesses Taiwanese industries’ compliance with these two types of CM rules. By exploring the compliance practices of Taiwanese suppliers through the use of
questionnaires, we found that some Taiwanese companies have started to
follow CM rules because of their supply contracts, which demonstrates that
applicable CM rules have been transplanted into Taiwan through supply
contracts even without formal legal transplantation initiated by the government.
Second, as for transplanted objects, the Taiwanese case study indicates
that Taiwanese suppliers more often comply with CM rules developed by
the EICC than those enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act. This finding indicates that private standards developed by industries themselves or NGOs in
a bottom-up approach (please see Category 4 in Table 1) may be more effective or widely acceptable than public standards or state laws enacted by a
foreign government in a top-down approach (please see Category 2 in Table
1) when it comes to adopting or implementing transnational CSR standards
in suppliers’ countries. This article proffers a theoretical analysis of how
Taiwanese suppliers helped their buyers comply with the two kinds of CM
rules, suggesting that private, soft rules might be accepted more easily or
play a more viable regulatory role than public or state laws from buyers’
countries in the context of transnational private governance or global gov158

See supra Part I.
This theme was also illustrated in Professor Li-wen Lin’s article in 2009. See generally Lin, supra note 16.
159
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ernance.
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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The electronic version of the questionnaire used in this study has been
converted into the set of questions listed below, which are English translations of the original Chinese version.
I. Background Information
1. Company information: Please provide us with information about
your company
(1) The industry and
A. Semiconductors; B. Printed circuit boards
its main products
(“PCBs”); C. Communications; D. Computers; E.
(please refer to the
Flat panel displays; F. Electric machinery; G. SoAnnex for industry
lar energy; H. Others
classification on the
Main products [_____________]
final page)160
It is in the [upstream], [midstream], or [downstream] of the industry
(2) Scale*
A. Small and medium-sized enterprises
(“SMEs”)
B. Other larger companies
(3) Listed on TaiA. Listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange
wanese stock marB. Listed in General Stock Board run by Taipei
ket?
Exchange
C. Neither
(4) Listed on the US
A. Yes
stock market?
B. No
2. Personal Information:
(1) Which department in your company do you work for?

A. Procurement
B. Supply chain management
C. Legal
D. CSR
E. Other (please specify___________)
(2) Which of the fol- A. Conflict minerals (“CM”) rules (Sec. 1502)
lowing rules or laws
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
are the most familiar
and Consumer Protection Act
to you?**
B. The EICC Code of Conduct
C. Neither
D. Both are familiar
II. The General Approach to “Conflict Minerals Disclosure” in Your
Company
160

The Annex listing industry classifications is included herein as Table 3, in Part III.
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1. Has your company A. Investigated and disclosed
conducted CM in- B. Investigated but not disclosed
vestigations and
C. Disclosed without conducting any investigadisclosed the retions
sults on your web- D. Neither
site?
If your answer to Question 1 was “C” or “D”, please jump to Question
11
2. When did your
A. 2008 or before 2008
company conduct
B. 2009
its first CM inves- C. 2010
tigation?
D. 2011
E. 2012
F. 2013 or after 2013
3. What was the inA. We were directly required to by our buyers
centive for your
B. Investigating to follow the market trend of our
company to conbuyers in advance
duct CM investiga- C. Investigating to comply with standards long
tions for the first
adopted by ourselves
time?
D. To take the initiative in investigations without
being required to or following the trend
3a. What were the
A. The EICC Code of Conduct
laws or rules to
B. Required to by the US SEC (that is, CM rules
follow, if any?
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act)
C. Other international standards
D. Other
3b. For your prod- A. The United States
ucts involving
B. An EU Member State
CMs, in which
C. Japan
country was the D. Other (please specify ____________)
major buyer located?
* Definition of SMEs: according to the Standards for Identifying Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises published by the Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, SMEs are defined as follows:
The enterprise is an enterprise in the manufacturing, construction, mining or quarrying industry with either paid-in capital of NT$80 million or
less, or fewer than 200 regular employees.
The enterprise is an enterprise in an industry other than those men283
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tioned in Subparagraph A above with either a sales revenue of NT$100 million or less in the previous year, or fewer than 100 regular employees.
** According to the definition under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, CMs referred to tantalum, tin,
tungsten, and gold. The production of these minerals could originate in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and its adjacent countries. Transactions
involving these minerals may potentially fund armed groups in these countries. These same minerals are defined under the EICC Code of Conduct.
Annex: Industry Classification
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